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WARRANTLESS RESIDENTIAL SEARCHES TO PREVENT THE
DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE: A NEED FOR STRICT STANDARDS
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees the right of any individual
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
1
The United States Supreme Court has long recog-
nized that, whenever practicable, the reasonable-
ness of a search ought to be determined by a
neutral and detached magistrate rather than an
officer engaged in the competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.2 Without advance judicial ap-
proval through the warrant procedure, a search is
considered per se unreasonable, subject only to a
few narrow and well-delineated exceptions.3 War-
rantless searches have been deemed reasonable
where "exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative" 4-that is, when the search is incident
to a lawful arrest; 5 when the search is of a motor
'U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.2 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948):
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often
is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it
denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evi-
dence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of fer-
reting out crime.
See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07
(1965) ("The fact that exceptions to the requirement that
searches and seizures be undertaken only after obtaining
a warrant are limited underscores the preference ac-
corded police action taken under a warrant as against
searches and seizures without one").
3 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455
(1971) (plurality opinion). See also Cleary, Recent Develop-
ment in the Law of Search and Seizure, I NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF.
21 (1975).
4 403 U.S. at 455.
5 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (permitting
a warrantless search incident to a valid arrest in the area
immediately within the defendant's reach). Chime! mod-
ified United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950),
which had permitted the search of the individual and the
premises of the arrestee.
25
vehicle capable of being driven away before a
warrant may be obtained; 6 when an item taken is
in plain view;7 when an individual is stopped and
frisked;8 where police aie in hot pursuit of a crim-
inal; 9 when consent is given for a search;10 and
where an "emergency" arises."
Recent federal and state court decisions indicate
the existence of another exception to the warrant
requirement, permitting police to enter residences
without a warrant and seize evidence solely to
prevent the destruction of that evidence. The con-
stitutionality of this exception has never been ad-
dressed directly by the United States Supreme
Court. However, the lower federal and state courts
have relied upon Supreme Court dicta to permit
warrantless entries into homes to prevent the de-
struction of evidence. Significantly, homes tradi-
tionally have been accorded special fourth amend-
ment protections.12 Thus, unless courts develop
strict standards for permitting these warrantless
intrusions, this new exception may virtually swal-
low those special home protections.
This comment will review the federal and state
court decisions which to varying degrees have per-
mitted warrentless searches where evidence may be
destroyed. First, this comment will set forth Su-
preme Court decisions containing dicta suggesting
the existence of the destruction of evidence excep-
6 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
'Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)
(plurality opinion). Coolidge permits warrantless seizures
of items in plain view if the officers have priorjustification
for the intrusion and if the circumstances bringing the
items into plain view are inadvertant.
8 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
' Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
'o Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
" Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
12 At common law, the courts held that "a man's house
is his castle for safety and repose to himself and family."
FOSTER, CROWN CAsss 318-22 at 319 (1762). The high
regard for the home at common law was embodied in the
fourth amendment. "Freedom from intrusion into the
home or dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protec-
tion secured by the Fourth Amendment." Dorman v.
United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en
banc).
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tion. Second, it will analyze the direction that
federal and state courts have taken in applying the
Supreme Court's language. Third, it will identify
developing patterns and suggest guidelines to ac-
commodate the realistic needs of law enforcement
officials as well as the fundamental privacy interest
of the individual. Finally, the comment will con-
clude that warrantless entries should be considered
valid within certain carefully defined limitations.
I. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS ON THE DEsmUCTIoN
OF EVIDENCE EXCEPTION
The Supreme Court has never directly consid-
ered whether a warrantless entry and search is
permissible solely to prevent the destruction of
evidence.13 But in loosely reasoned dicta, the Court
has opened the door for such an exception where
evidence is "threatened with destruction," where
there is a possibility of "imminent destruction" and
where evidence is in the "process of destruction."
The Court first recognized that a warrantless
entry might be justified where evidence was
"threatened with destruction" in Johnson v. United
States.14 In that case, the defendant Johnson was
convicted of violating federal narcotics laws after
his hotel room was searched without a warrant.15
Police officers had gone to the hotel room after
receiving an informant's tip that opium was being
smoked there. While walking through the hall, the
officers smelled the strong odor of burning opium
emanating from one room, knocked on the door
and identified themselves as police. Upon hearing
people in the room moving around, the officers
entered the room, arrested the defendant, and
confiscated opium and smoking apparatus.
On appeal, the Court found the warrantless
search invalid and reversed the defendant's convic-
tion. The Court stated: "There are exceptional
I" In fact, the Court has consistently denied certiorari,
without comment, when petitioned to review lower court
decisions which have recognized such an exception. One
can only speculate as to the reason for the Court's reluc-
tance to consider directly the validity of such an excep-
tion. That reluctance may reflect the Court's movement
away from the exclusionary rule and represent an un-
willingness to curb police action in this area. It is the
position of this comment, however, that the Court needs
to consider directly such an exception and set standards
for its use to ensure the continued protection of the fourth
amendment guarantees.
14 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
Is The constitutional protection provided in the fourth
amendment for homes has been extended in the case law
to apartments, hotel rooms, garages, business offices,
stores, and warehouses to the degree that these are closed
to the public. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 357 (1970).
circumstances in which, on balancing the need for
effective law enforcement against the right of pri-
vacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's
warrant for a search may be dispensed with. But
this is not such a case."' 16 The Court explained that
because no evidence or contraband had been
threatened with removal or destruction,17 the only
possible reasons for not obtaining a warrant was
mere inconvenience to the officers and slight de-
lay.18 Lower federal courts have interpreted this
explanation to mean that if there had been a threat
of removal or destruction of evidence, the warrantless
search would have been approved.19
Giving further support to this interpretation, the
Court upheld a warrantless search in Schmerber v.
California,2° where the evidence seized was
"threatened with destruction"-this time by nat-
ural causes. In that case, the petitioner, suspected
of drunken driving, was arrested at a hospital.
After the petitioner refused to consent to a blood
test, the officer directed the physician to take a
blood sample. The report of the chemical analysis
of the blood, which indicated intoxication, was
admitted into evidence. The petitioner claimed
that the evidence should have been excluded as the
product of an unconstitutional search and seizure.
However, the Court held that because the evidence
of blood-alcohol content was threatened with de-
struction, police appropriately seized that evidence
incident to the petitioner's arrest. 1
Language in Schmerber indicates that if evidence
is threatened with destruction, the same rationale
that permits a warrantless search of the body may
i6 333 U.S. at 14-15.
17 This was with the exception of perhaps the fumes
which we suppose in time will disappear. But they
were not capable at any time of being reduced to
possession for presentation to the court. The evi-
dence of their existence before the search was ade-
quate and the testimony of the officers to that effect
would not peiish from the delay of getting a war-
rant.
Id. at 15.
18Similarly, in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S.
610, 615 (1961), the Court disallowed the warrantless
search of the petitioner's home in his absence and the
seizure of an unregistered "distillery." The Court relied
on the reasoning in Johnson that "[njo evidence or contra-
band was threatened with removal or destruction, except
the fumes which we suppose in time would disappear."
S'See United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.
1974), notes 94-100 and accompanying text infa; United
States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 833 (1973), notes 72-77 and accompanying text
infra.
20 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
21 Id. at 770-71.
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well permit a warrantless search of the home.
Indeed, as the Court stated: "Search warrants are
ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and,
absent an emergency, no less could be required
where intrusions into the human body are con-
cerned."'sa Since the Court considered the body to
be no less protected than a home, this language
suggests, by analogy, that a policeman can enter
the home as well as the body to prevent the
threatened destruction of evidence.23 However, the
facts of Schmerber may limit its broad assertions.
Because the warrantless search was conducted in-
cident to a valid arrest, the decision does not
necessarily mean that a warrantless search may be
conducted solely to prevent the destruction of evi-
dence, where there is no other valid initial intru-
sion. Further, in Schmerber, the evidence-alcoholic
content in the blood-was certain to diminish be-
fore ajudicial warrant could have been obtained.U
Thus, Schmerber does not directly establish an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement where evidence
in the home is threatened with destruction.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Jeffers
suggested that the "imminent destruction" of evi-
dence may justify a warrantless search.25 InJeffers,
a policeman and a hotel detective entered the
defendants' room and seized narcotics. But, be-
cause the narcotics did not appear to be in immi-
nent danger of being destroyed at the time of the
search, the Court held that the search was illegal.
As the Court explained:
They [the occupants] were not even present when
the entry, search and seizure were conducted; nor
were there exceptional circumstances present tojus-
tify the action of the officers. There was no question
of violence, no movable vehicle was involved, nor
was there an arrest or an imminent destruction,
removal or concealment of the property intended to
be seized. In fact, the officers admit they could have
easily prevented any such destruction or removal by
merely guarding the door.s2
22ld. at 770.
23 See Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), where
fingernail scrapings were taken from the defendant over
his protest and without a warrant while he was being
questioned in connection with a murder. The Court
found that the warrantless search did not violate the
defendant's fourth amendment rights, but was necessary
in order to preserve the highly evanescent evidence which
the officers found under the fingernails. Id. at
296. However, this case did not draw any analogy
between the destruction of evidence located under the
finmernails and that located in a residence.A7384 U.S. at 770.
2' 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951) (emphasis supplied).
6 Id at 52.
The Court did not directly establish the destruction
of evidence exception; it did so by negative infer-
ence only. Thus, one cannot be certain whether the
Jeffersr Court would have allowed a warrantless
seizure if it had found "imminent destruction,
removal or concealment" of evidence.
The Supreme Court has furthered indicated that
it might allow warrantless entries into residences if
it can be shown that the officers knew that the
evidence was actually in the process of being de-
stroyed. For example, in McDonald v. United States
, 7
police forced their way into a room rented by the
petitioner, who was suspected of engaging in an
illegal lottery. The warrantless entry and seizure of
machines, papers, and money, while in plain view,
was found unjustified. The petitioner had been
under surveillance for several months and when
police heard the adding machine, they looked
through the transom and saw the activities within.
Thus, the Court found that the officer "certainly
had adequate grounds for seeking a search war-
rant . '28 Further, the Court found that no excep-
tional circumstancesjustified foregoing the warrant
requirement since the defendant was not fleeing or
seeking to escape, "[n]or was the property in the
process of destruction. ' ' 9 According to the Court,
mere inconvenience was the reason police did not
seek a warrant-but that reason was not considered
sufficient to justify foregoing fourth amendment
safeguards.
The Supreme Court again suggested that a war-
rantless entry might be permitted when evidence
is "in the process of destruction" in Vale v. Louis-
iana,"3 the case most frequently cited in support of
the destruction exception. There, the police had
obtained arrest warrants for the defendant Vale3'
and were watching his house when they observed
a suspected narcotics transaction outside the house.
The defendant also noticed the police and quickly
walked back toward the house, where the police
arrested him on the steps of the home. Police made
a cursory inspection of the house to see whether
anyone was inside. Three minutes later, Vale's
mother and brother were seen approaching the
home. Police informed them of Vale's arrest and
conducted a detailed warrantless search of the
house for narcotics, which were found in the rear
27335 U.S. 451 (1948).
28 Id. at 455.
29 id.
30399 U.S. 30 (1970).
s The arrest warrants were issued because the bond
had been increased for an earlier narcotics charge pend-
ing against Vale. Id. at 40 (Black, J., dissenting).
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bedroom. 3 2 The Louisana Supreme Court found
that it would have been unreasonable "to require
the officers under the facts of the case to first secure
a search warrant before searching the premises, as
time is of the essence inasmuch as the officers never
know whether there is anyone on the premises to
be searched who could very easily destroy the
evidence."a
The United States Supreme Court reversed, not-
ing that the police knew when they entered the
house that no one was present to destroy the evi-
dence. The Court found no exceptional circum-
stances justifying a search without a warrant, since
the goods seized were not "in the process of destruc-
tion."'  Finally, the Court emphasized that the
impracticability of obtaining a search warrant was
never established:
The officers were able to procure two warrants for
Vale's arrest. They also had information that he
was residing at the address where they found him.
There is thus no reason, so far as anything before us
appears, to suppose that it was impracticable for
them to obtain a search warrant as well. 4
The Court's reasoning suggests that a warrantless
search might have been justified if someone was in
the house when the defendant was arrested, and if
the evidence seized was "in the process of destruc-
tion." Thus, arguably, Vale implicitly recognized
the destruction of evidence exception, but found its
application to be inappropriate under the partic-
ular facts of the case.
Justice Black, dissenting in Vale, stated that there
did exist exigent circumstances to uphold a war-
rantless search. He reasoned that the arrest of Vale
in front of the house, "in a spot readily visible to
anyone in the house,"3 made an immediate search
of the house necessary. The delay in obtaining a
warrant would have given an accomplice time to
destroy the narcotics. According to Justice Black,
32 Id. at 31-33.
3a State v. Vale, 252 La. 1056, 1070, 215 So. 2d 811,
816 (1968).
399 U.S. at 35.
a Id. at 35. This reason for justifying the failure to
uphold the warrantless search was criticized by Professor
LaFave in Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further
Ventures into the "Quaqmire", 8 CraM. L. BULL. 9, 16-17
(1972). Professor LaFave pointed out that the warrants
concerned increases in Vale's bond and not the narcotics
transaction. It was not until the police observed the
narcotics transaction that probable cause came into
being. Professor LaFave found the Court's reasoning
baffling and criticized the Court for not clearly articulat-
ing the reasons for invalidating the warrantless search.
36 399 U.S. at 39 (Black, J., dissenting).
when the mother and brother arrived, "what had
been a suspicion became a certainty: Vale's rela-
tives were in possession and knew of his arrest. 37
In Justice Black's opinion, evidence was threatened
with removal or destruction, and thus, according
to Johnson, the warrantless search was justified.34
The strongest support for the destruction of evi-
dence exception may be found in United States v.
Santana.39 There, an undercover agent passed
marked money to a drug dealer, ostensibly for the
purchase of heroin. Following the sale, the dealer
was arrested and told the police that respondent
Santana had the money. When police drove to
Santana's home, they found her standing in the
doorway with a brown bag in her hand. The
officers yelled "police," and she retreated into her
house. The police followed, catching her in the
vestibule. As she tried to pull away, the bag was
ripped and white powder, later fouiid to be heroin,
fell to the floor. Police searched Santana and found
the marked money.
Santana's motion to suppress the heroin and
marked money as evidence obtained from an illegal
search was granted by the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and
affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. In
reversing, the United States Supreme Court char-
acterized the warrantless entry as permissible
within the "hot pursuit" exception:
The fact that the pursuit here ended almost as soon
as it began did not render it any the less a "hot
pursuit" sufficient to justify the warrantless entry
into Santana's house. Once Santana saw the police,
there was likewise a realistic expectation that any
delay would result in destruction of evidence. Once
she had been arrested the search, incident to that
arrest, which produced the drugs and money was
clearly justified.'
Thus, a warrantless entry and search was justified
where officers were in "hot pursuit," where the
entry and search were incident to a valid arrest,
and where officers sought to prevent the destruc-
tion of evidence. Traditionally, each of the first
two conditions would have been independently
sufficient to allow a search without a warrant. Yet,
3 Id. at 38.
8 Id. at 39-41. The majority of the Court, however,
did not look to whether the evidence was "threatened
with destruction," as suggested in Johnson; rather, the
majority concluded in dicta that the warrantless search
was not justified because the "goods ultimately seized
were not in the process of destruction." Id. at 35.
-1 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
40 Id. at 43 (citation omitted).
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it is not altogether clear that, in the absence of hot
pursuit and a valid arrest, police could have made
a warrantless entry and search for the sole purpose
of preventing the possible destruction of evidence.
Without squarely deciding that issue, the Court, in
its discussion of Vale, seemed to recognize the de-
struction of evidence exception. Indeed, even Jus-
tice Marshall in his dissent recognized a destruction
exception: "[T]he danger that the evidence would
be destroyed and the suspects gone before a war-
rant could be obtained would ordinarily justify the
police's quick return to Santana's home and the
warrantless entry and arrest."'
In sum, the United States Supreme Court has
not expressly established an independent "destruc-
tion of evidence" exception to the fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement. Although the existence
of that exception may reasonably be inferred from
ample dicta, the application of the exception is
somewhat less clear. The Supreme Court's loosely
reasoned dicta suggest approval for warrantless
entries when evidence is "threatened with destruc-
tion,','42 when there is a possibility of "imminent
destruction, ' A3 or when the evidence is "in the
process of destruction."" The Court has treated
these situations separately, but has never explained
how, if at all, they are different. Indeed, there may
be considerable overlap. For instance, if evidence
is not threatened with imminent destruction, it is
doubtful that police could show the impracticabil-
ity of obtaining a warrant-a burden created by
Vale.4 5 Thus, while opening the door for warrantless
searches to prevent the destruction of evidence, the
Supreme Court has not provided clear guidance
for application of that exception to fourth amend-
ment guarantees.
II. LOWER FEDERAL AND STATE COURT
APPLICATION OF THE SUPREME COURT DICTA
Despite the fact that the United States Supreme
Court has not expressly recognized a destruction of
evidence exception to the fourth amendment, lower
federal and state courts have done so in two main
categories of cases. The first is where the destruc-
tion or removal of evidence is certain or highly
probable unless police act promptly. This category
4' Id. at 48 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948); see
notes 14-24 and accompanying text supra.
43 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951); see
notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
4McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455
(1948); see notes 27-38 and accompanying text supra.
-See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
includes situations in which the evidence is being
destroyed by natural causes and in which officers
actually witness the destruction or removal of evi-
dence. The second major category is where the
destruction of evidence is merely possible-for in-
stance, where evidence could be destroyed or re-
moved from the jurisdiction by the defendant or
third parties. These two basic categories, with the
representative subcategories, will serve as the or-
ganizational framework for the analysis of the
lower court decisions. A major concern throughout
the analysis will be whether police created or ex-
acerbated the exigent circumstances in order to
justify the warrantless entry.
A. WHERE THE DESTRUCTION OR REMOVAL OF
EVIDENCE IS CERTAIN OR HIGHLY PROBABLE
1. Evidence Being Destroyed by Natural Causes
Where evidence is certain to be destroyed by
natural causes, lower courts have found exigent
circumstances sufficient to permit warrantless entry
into a residence solely to prevent the destruction of
evidence. These cases are not unlike the situation
faced by the police in Schmerber v. California," where
the United States Supreme Court held that it was
proper to take blood from an arrested individual
to determine intoxication becaue the percentage of
alcohol would have diminished rapidly in the time
needed to obtain a warrant. The Court character-
ized this as an exigent circumstance and allowed
the warrantless "search" of the defendant's blood.
Lower courts have permitted warrantless entries
into residences where, without immediate action,
evidence would have been destroyed by nature.
For instance, in United States v. Gargotto,47 gambling'
evidence was seized during a warrantless search of
the defendant's offices during a fire in the building.
Police had entered the flaming building to search
for evidence of arson and found wagering forms in
plain view. They proceeded to look for more evi-
dence of gambling and found it in file cabinets.
Meanwhile, firemen were chopping walls, hosing
the area with water, and discarding flammable
material.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, find-
ing that a real danger of water damage and possible
destruction of evidence existed if the officers took
time to obtain a warrant. The court cited Johnson
46 384 U.S. 757 (1966); see notes 20-24 and accompa-
nying text supra.




v. United States48 for the proposition that a search is
justified where evidence is "threatened with de-
struction." Thus, the court concluded that an
emergency existed "regardless of whether the
flames were still live or had been extinguished, in
light of the fact that active and necessary fire-
fighting procedures continued to take place which
could reasonably have been found to threaten destruc-
tion of the evidence."
49
Similarly, the legality of a warrantless seizure of
arson evidence at the scene of a fire in the defend-
ant's home was upheld in Steigler v. Anderson.5° In
that case, the district court cited several reasons for
permitting the search, including the possibility that
the evidence of arson would be destroyed by the
fire. The court found that "under the circum-
stances then existing, some of it [the arson evidence]
being of a highly volatile nature, might have
caught on fire or the contents of the containers
overturned, and, thus, valuable evidence of a crime
destroyed."5' While the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals relied on different grounds in upholding
the warrantless search,52 that court did suggest that
one reason for allowing the warrantless seizure was
the possibility of the destruction of evidence by
fire. Without identifying upon which Supreme
Court language it was relying, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that "much of the evidence
was highly flammable (e.g., containers filled with
gasoline and rugs soaked with gasoline) rendering
it imperative that they [sic] be seized and re-
moved. '"m
Similarly, where wet boots and denim pants if
allowed to dry would have lost their probative
value as evidence, the Colorado Court of Appeals
48 333 U.S. 10 (1948); see notes 14-19 and accompa-
nying text supra.
49 510 F.2d 409, 412 (6th Cir. 1974) (emphasis sup-
plied). Arguably, the court could have upheld the consti-
tutionality of the search by applying the stricter "in
process of destruction" language of Vale v. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 30 (1970), since the officers knew that the
evidence was being destroyed as a result of the fire and
the firemen's activities. See notes 30-38 and accompany-
ing text supra.
360 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Del.), aFfd, 496 F.2d 793 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1002 (1974).
'" 360 F. Supp. at 1293. Among the other reasons for
its decision, the court found that an emergency, the fire,
caused the warrantless investigation. Furthermore, the
court found the search justified under the plain-view
doctrine.
2 496 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1002
(1974). The warrantless residential search was upheld
because the fire, an emergency, justified the firemen
entering the residence without a warrant.
53 496 F.2d at 797 n.12.
approved a warrantless search and seizure of that
evidence in People v. Clark.5s While police were
investigating a rape, they received a description of
the assailant and observed two sets of boot prints
in fresh snow. One set led to the residence of the
victim and the other set of similar size and tread
led away from the victim's residence to the defend-
ant's residence. The officers knocked at the defend-
ant's door and entered the apartment in search of
the boots. The police found a pair of wet boots
which had similar tread and seized them along
with a pair of wet denim pants. Relying on Schmer-
ber55 and Vale ss the court denied the defendant's
motion to suppress, reasoning that where circum-
stances suggest to officers "that the physical con-
dition of [the] evidence having probative value will
not be ascertainable if the investigation is delayed
in order to obtain a search warrant, then a war-
rantless search and seizure are permissible." 57 The
court found that there was a certainty-not just a
probability-that relevant, probative evidence
would have been destroyed if the boots dried. Thus,
although there would have been probable cause to
obtain a warrant, the Colorado court concluded
that the danger of evidence being lost made the
warrantless entry permissible.
In sum, only a few cases have considered whether
sufficient exigent circumstances exist to support a
warrantless entry when evidence could have been
lost by natural causes if time had been taken to
obtain a warrant. However, those courts that have
addressed the issue have upheld the constitution-
ality of such entries. By definition, warrantless
entries in this situation are not based on emergen-
cies contrived by police. Thus, regardless of which
Supreme Court language is applied, the absence of
a warrant does not pose a great threat to the
defendant's fourth amendment rights. On balance,
the need for immediate action to preserve the
evidence may well outweight the individual's right
to privacy. United States v. Gargottoo demonstrated
that in case of fire, the police needed to act im-
mediately or else the evidence most probably would
have been destroyed by the fire. Likewise, in Clark,
although probable cause to obtain a warrant ex-
isted, time was of the essence in seizing the wet
s 37 Colo. App. 188, 547 P.2d 267 (1976). See also
Note, Residential Searches to Prevent the Destruction of Evidence:
An Emerging Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 47 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 517 (1976).
w See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
"
6 See notes 30-38 and accompanying text supra.
5 548 P. 2d at 271.




boots and pants. Consequently, as long as police
can prove the necessity of immediate seizure with-
out a warrant, any infringement of individual
rights will be reasonable and permitted by the
fourth amendment. 59
2. Officers Witnessing the Destruction or Removal of
Evidence
Exigent circumstances are similarly evident
where an officer witnesses the destruction or re-
moval of evidence. In this situation, not only do
the officers have probable cause to conduct a
search, but they also have direct knowledge that a
crime is being committed. Here, the officer must
determine whether to allow the evidence to be
destroyed or removed during the time needed to
obtain a warrant or to enter the premises to prevent
the destruction of the evidence. Generally, the
lower courts have permitted warrantless searches
of this type solely to prevent the destruction of
evidence.
For example, the court in United States v. Blake,6°
applied the "imminent removal or destruction"
langugage of United States v. effers ' in finding that
exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrant-
less entry to prevent the destruction of evidence. In
Blake, while officers were executing an arrest war-
rant in the front of an apartment building, another
officer in the rear of the building observed the
defendant come onto the balcony and start throw-
ing a white change purse over the side. The officer,
suspecting that the purse contained narcotics, iden-
tified himself and ordered the defendant to stop,
but the defendant quickly moved into the apart-
ment. Thus, the officer actually witnessed the de-
fendant's attempt to remove or destroy evidence.
Immediately following the observation of the de-
fendant, the officers entered the apartment without
a search warrant, conducted a search, and found
the white coin purse containing heroin.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals62 held that
59 Particularly important in this respect is a study of
the Los Angeles Police Department, which found that an
average of six hours was needed to obtain a search
warrant. The study supports the conclusion that a search
warrant should not be required where there exists the
necessity of immediate seizure. See Man Hour, Cost Study
Re: Chimel Decision, Addenda II, Sept. 24, 1969 (unof-
ficial departmental report), discussed in Note, Police Prac-
tices and the Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evidence, 84
HARv. L. REv. 1465, 1478-79 n.61 (1971).
60 484 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1973).
61 342 U.S. 48 (1951); see notes 25-26 and accompa-
nying text supra.
6- The court relied upon United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48 (1951) in its decision.
when narcotics are threatened with "imminent
removal or destruction," a warrantless search is
permitted. 63 The court rejected the "in process of
destruction" language of Vale v. Louisiana,64 reason-
ing that "to wait until contraband is actually in
the process of destruction could possibly forego the
opportunity to seize the narcotics." s5 The court
found that the Jeffers standard satisfied both the
need for a prompt warrantless entry and the need
to protect an individual's right to privacy against
nonjudicially approved searches.66
The "imminent destruction or removal of evi-
dence" language ofJeffers was also applied by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Delguyd.17 There, the defendant fled from federal
agents when they attempted to serve him with a
warrant and drove to the apartment complex of a
confederate. Both were suspected of being involved
in loan-sharking activities. While arresting the de-
fendant in the parking lot, one agent noticed the
confederate watching the activities from an apart-
ment window, and then disappearing from sight
into the apartment. The agents rushed to the apart-
ment door and demanded entry. Upon hearing
rustling noises and a flushing toilet, the agents
broke into the apartment where they found the
confederate tearing up papers and flushing them
down the toilet.' The officers seized the papers
from the toilet and left them drying in the living
room, secured the apartment, and proceeded to
obtain a search warrant. The appellate court con-
cluded that this warrantless entry was permissible
since evidence of a federal crime probably would
have been found on the premises and that such
63 United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50, 54 (8th Cir.
1973).
64 399 U.S. 30 (1970); see text accompanying notes 30-
38 supra.
65 484 F.2d at 55.
66 Since the police officer saw the defendant attempt
to remove the evidence from the apartment before the
officers decided to enter, arguably the evidence was in
the process of destruction and the Vale language could
have been applied. The court, however, was concerned
with the type of evidence that the defendant was destroy-
ing. Thus, since drugs can be quickly removed or de-
stroyed, the court may have found that the Vale language
imposed too high of a burden.
EP542 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1976).
68 The Sixth Circuit noted that loan sharking requires
the keeping of detailed records; so when the agents heard
the rustling noises and the toilet flushing, the court
concluded: "[Wihile other explanations can be proposed
for these events, under the circumstances we find that a
reasonable person could conclude from the events that
evidence in the apartment was most probably being
destroyed." Id. at 351.
19791
evidence probably would have been destroyed if
the officers had to obtain a warrant.
69
Arguably, if the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
had applied the stricter language of "in the process
of destruction," the court could still have upheld
the validity of the warrantless search. The officers
knew that the confederate was an associate of the
defendant who, they had probable cause to believe,
was involved in loan-sharking activities.70 In addi-
tion, the officers heard the rustling noise and the
flushing toilet. These facts strongly suggested that
the evidence was in the process of being destroyed.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals however,
adopted the Jeffers language in upholding the con-
stitutionality of the search.
These decisions7' approve the destruction of ev-
idence exception where, in the court's opinion, the
evidence would have been destroyed if the officers
had taken the time needed to procure a warrant.
Clearly, the officers' decision not to obtain a war-
rant were based on their knowledge of the imme-
diate threat and the need for prompt police action.
In these decisions, police themselves did not create
the emergency to justify their warrantless search.
However, despite the general appropriateness of
permitting searches in these situations, the possi-
bility of police misconduct is not nonexistent. Thus,
courts must carefully review the facts in each case
to determine whether official misconduct
prompted the attempt to destroy the evidence.
B. WHERE THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IS
MERELY POSSIBLE
1. Evidence Could Be Destroyed by a Third Person
Lower courts also have permitted warrantless
searches where evidence might be destroyed by a
6Id. at 350-51.
70 1d. at 351. The FBI had also intercepted phone
conversations which, althought somewhat ambiguous,
were certainly suspicious in nature and could reasonably
have been interpreted as indicating that loan transactions
involving the defendant and confederate had taken place.
71 See also Gaines v. Craven, 448 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir.
1971) (per curiam), where the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the seizure of evidence without a war-
rant. In Gaines, the officers witnessed the defendant at-
tempt to prevent the police from confiscating the evi-
dence by throwing it back into the house. No Supreme
Court language was mentioned in the decision. See also
Commonwealth v. Phillips 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 42, 366
A.2d 306 (1976), where officers, investigating an inform-
ant's tip, witnessed drugs being removed from the de-
fendant's table after the door was voluntarily opened by
one of the occupants of the house. There, the officers
entered and seized the evidence without a warrant. The
court upheld the legality of the warrantless search, but
third person who is associated with the defendant.
The risk of violating the defendant's rights is in-
creased in these situations, for the officers' deter-
mination of whether third parties are on the prem-
ises or will destroy the evidence is somewhat more
speculative.
A leading federal decision in this area is United
States v. Rubin,72 where the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court and held that
exceptional circumstances existed to justify a war-
rantless entry of a home. There, a statue containing
hashish, which was under constant surveillance,
was taken by the defendant to his home. The
defendant subsequently was arrested in a gasoline
station six blocks from his home and at that point
yelled "call my brother." Shortly thereafter, the
officers entered the defendant's home without a
warrant in order to protect the evidence.
The district court invalidated th6 search, finding
that a warrantless entry was not permissible unless
the officers had knowledge that the evidence was
actually being destroyed. The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals concluded, however, that the officers
did not need actual knowledge of the removal or
destruction before they could act.7 3 In allowing the
admission of the evidence, the court stated that
recent Supreme Court cases only required a reason-
able belief that the evidence was threatened with
destruction.74 Importantly, the court enunciated
five factors to consider in determining the reason-
ableness of a warrantless search to prevent the
destruction of evidence:
(1) [T~he degree of urgency involved and the
amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant.
(2) [The] reasonable belief that the contraband is
about to be removed.
did not specify the Supreme Court language upon which
it was relying.
72 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833
(1973).
73 Id. at 266-68. The district court had relied on Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 402 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion); and
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
7" The Third Circuit Court of Appeals based its con-
clusion onJohnson, McDonald, and Vale. It recognized that
Vale spoke of evidence "in the process of being destroyed"
whereas the Supreme Court had spoken of "threatened"
destruction or removal of evidence in previous cases. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, however, that
"the omission of a single word should not be given such
significance" for the court found that the facts in Vale
did not even support a belief "that there was even a




(3) [Tihe possibility of danger to the police officers
guarding the site of the contraband while a
search warrant is sought.
(4) [The] information indicating the possessors of
contraband are aware that the police are on
their trail.
(5) [T~he ready destructibility of the contraband
and the knowledge "that efforts to dispose of
narcotics and to escape are characteristic behav-
ior of persons engaged in the narcotics traffic.
' 7 5
After weighing these factors, the court found that
sufficient exigent circumstances existed to forego
the warrant requirement.7 6 The Third Circuit
court emphasized that there is a strong preference
for searches pursuant to a warrant, but concluded:
"Our vigilance in protecting the privacy of the
individual in his home must not absolutely pre-
clude officers of the law, when they are confronted
with exigent circumstances, from effective criminal
investigation and law enforcement in curbing ille-
gal narcotics traffic."' '
Where evidence may be easily destroyed by third
7
s Id. at 268; see notes 108-09 and accompanying text
infra for further discussion of these factors.
76 The agents actually possessed more than probable
cause that hashish was in the premises. Their inspection
of the crate at the airport, which the defendant subse-
quently picked up and delivered to his garage, revealed
that hashish was inside. Furthermore, the house had been
under surveillance by the government agents who were
aware that at least one of the men had been seen with
the defendant when the narcotics were brought to the
house. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the agents
to believe that at least one of the occupants was involved
with the defendant in the drug business. Even though the
police had no knowledge that the defendant had a
brother or that a phone call was made, the court found
that it was not unreasonable to believe that the defend-
ant, who had intentionally driven to the gas station in
the neighborhood and was apparently known to the
individuals there, was attempting to alert persons in the
house. Id. at 269. See also State v. Pope, 192 Neb. 755, 224
N.W.2d 521 (1974) (warrantless search justified since the
defendant upon arrest called out the telephone number
known to be the number of her house which was under
surveillance for narcotics); Winter v. State, 332 So. 2d 46
(Fla. App. 1976) (warrantless search justified since de-
fendant's confederate yelled: "It's a raid. It's a raid,"
while blowing the vehicle's horn); People v. Fraser, 62
Ill. App. 3d 142, 379 N.E.2d 10 (1978) (warrantless search
justified since persons leaving an empty store suspected
of housing illegal gambling yelled "police" towards the
inside of the store. The court also concluded that the
police officers' conduct did not create the exigent circum-
stances. Rather, the police were merely following proper
procedures to confirm hearsay information provided by
an informant when their presence was detected).
7 474 F.2d at 270.
parties suspected of being present, various factual
situations have been found to justify warrantless
entries. For instance, in United States v. Gardner,78 a
suspected cocaine dealer and an informant-buyer
were conspicuously arrested in front of the suspect's
home after five police cars moved in and the agents
emerged with their guns drawn. Police were told
by the informant that a female was in the home,
but they were not certain that anyone actually had
observed the arrests and would attempt to destroy
the evidence. Nevertheless, police conducted a war-
rantless search which the Fifth Circuit court upheld
on the basis of exigent circumstances. 79 The court
dismissed the argument that the warrantless entry
was justified only if the agents knew that the de-
fendant's wife, a partner in the drug trade, was on
the premises. According to the court:
The agents could rely on the reasonable forecast
that anyone in the house at the time the defendant
and Gunn (the informant) were there might know
cocaine was present and, seeing the major arrest
activity in front of the house immediately upon
their departure, might be expected to dispose of it.8°
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has gone
further and upheld a warrantless entry where po-
lice did not even have actual knowledge that some-
one was on the premises. In United States v. Fulton,8 '
a suspected drug dealer was arrested in the parking
lot of a motel. Following the arrest, an informant
78 553 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1977); cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1011 (1978).
7 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed:
When Gunn told the agents someone was in the
house, an immediate entry became necessary to
prevent the disposal of the cocaine, a powder which
can easily be flushed down a toilet. The agents
could logically have suspected that anyone inside
the house would be well aware of the five police cars
ringing the premises and the arrest of the defendant
and Gunn. The danger that someone would dispose
of the illicit drugs was especially great in this case
because the agents knew the person in the house
might be Susan Gardner, the defendant's wife and
partner in the drug trade. Accordingly, the agents
justifiably acted "now or never" to preserve the
evidence of a crime.
8o Id at 948. See also United States v. McLaughlin, 525
F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976),
where a warrantless search for marijuana was conducted
following an arrest in front of the premises. Individuals
were known to be on the premises, and the arrest in-
creased the likelihood that they would become aware of
the surveillance. Although no one was actually seen
observing the arrest, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
likelihood of the discovery of the surveillance increased
the chance of the destruction of the evidence and justified
the warrantless entry.
8, 549 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1977).
who had just delivered drugs to the suspect's motel
room told the arresting agent that while in the
motel room he had noticed that the bathroom door
was closed. Extensive surveillance had revealed
that a woman was involved in the drug scheme
and had been observed entering that room on
several occasions. The arresting agent was not
aware that the woman had in fact left the room
after the defendant had gone to the parking lot.
The Ninth Circuit court did not find it unreason-
able for the agent to believe that the woman was
still in the room and would attempt to destroy the
evidence if she knew of the impending police inter-
vention.s2 Thus, the court permitted the agent's
search.
Generally, in this situation, police may well have
probable cause to believe that evidence is on the
premises. However, police may not be certain that
the evidence is being or will be destroyed, or that
an individual is actually present to carry out the
destruction. Therefore, a higher degree of specula-
tion will inevitably be involved. Additionally, there
is greater potential for official abuse since police
may have created or added to the emergency aris-
ing at the time a suspect is arrested or detained
outside his residence. Because the exigencyjustified
the warrantless entry, a consideration of police
conduct is imperative to determine if the emer-
gency that developed could have been reasonably
avoided. In view of the degree of speculation in-
volved and the potential for official abuse in these
82 If the agents had known in fact that the suspected
woman partner was not in the room, a different result
would probably have been reached. In Eng FungJem v.
United States, 281 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1960), the defend-
ant's hotel room was searched after police had received
information that the defendant was leaving town shortly.
The court held that the warrantless search in the defend-
ant's absence was not justified. The Ninth Circuit court
stated that the officers knew that the defendant was not
in the room at the time they entered and searched it and
that the officers could have prevented removal or destruc-
tion by merely guarding the door. In Fulton, however, the
agents did not in fact know that the room was vacant
but did believe that the woman, if inside, would most
probably have taken action on her own behalf or on
behalf of her partner. See also Ferrara v. State, 319 So. 2d
629 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), where a warrantless search
was invalidated upon a finding that no exigent circum-
stances existed. The court concluded that there was no
evidence that anyone else had access to the defendant's
apartment and that there wai no reason why the police
could not have secured the area while a warrant was
obtained. The court found that a speculative fear of
investigating officers is not sufficient to overcome the
strong presumption of invalidity accompanying a war-
rantless search.
cases, the risk of violating the defendant's fourth
amendment rights is increased.
2. Evidence Could Be Destroyed by the Defendant
Most courts which have permitted warrantless
entries to prevent destruction of evidence have
done so where the defendant himself is in a position
to destroy the evidence. The risk of violating the
defendant's rights is greatest in these situations, for
police could intentionally alert the defendant to
their presence and thus create the exigent circum-
stances necessary to conduct a warrantless search.
While a few courts have recognized the potential
for police abuse and have invalidated the warrant-
less entry upon finding that the emergency that
prompted the warrantless entry could have been
avoided,sa warrantless entries nevertheless have
been generally permitted.84
Concern that defendants would destroy all evi-
dence of a counterfeit money scheme in the time
needed to obtain a warrant was found to justify
the warrantless search in United States v. Guidry.85
There, the defendant's residence had been under
surveillance during an investigation of the coun-
terfeiting scheme. An undercover agent concluded
at the end of his second visit with the defendants
that they had become aware of his identity and
real purpose. Approximately fifteen minutes later
a fire was started on the carport of the residence.
Believing that the fire was intended to destroy the
evidence, a warrantless search of the home was
conducted.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the
findings of the district court that the printing press
and the plate would not have been destroyed in
the time necessary to obtain a warrant,86 but that
the counterfeit money easily would have been de-
stroyed by the fire. The court found it reasonable
for the police to have concluded that the defend-
ants on the premises were aware of the impending
police intervention and were attempting to destroy
the counterfeit money by fire. Under these condi-
tions, the warrantless search was upheld because
there was no alternative way to preserve the evi-
dence.
83 See notes 102-06 and accompanying text infra.
8' See notes 85-101 and accompanying text infra.
m 534 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1976).
86 Relying on similar reasoning, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Walker v. United States, 225 F.2d 447,450
(5th Cir. 1955), had invalidated the warrantless search of
a barn containing an illegal still because "no removal of
the contraband was possible, the officers being present
and able to place guards at all exits."
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, upon finding
that drug evidence was threatened with imminent
destruction, similarly upheld a warrantless entry in
United States v. Shima.87 There, following the arrest
of one suspect for drug possesion, the agents re-
turned to the apartment where they knew that two
men were awaiting their confederate's prompt re-
turn. The agents, upon seeing drugs through a
window and realizing that the evidence would
most probably be destroyed in the time needed to
obtain a warrant, conducted a warrantless search
and seized the drugs. As in Guidry, the officers in
Shima did not create the emergency, but conducted
the warrantless search when circumstances beyond
their control necessitated the immediate action.
Some circuits have gone further, however, and
have permitted warrantless searches when circum-
stances which necessitated the immediate action
were not completely beyond the control of the
police officers. In Thomas v. Parett,88 a warrantless
entry was found justified by the presence of exigent
circumstances caused by the police's owri delay.
There, during an around-the-clock surveillance of
an apartment, police overheard the defendants
indicate that the heroin had been cut, wrapped,
and just needed to be placed in plastic bags before
being distributed. Believing that the evidence
would have been removed during the hour needed
to obtain the warrant, the officers entered the
apartment without a warrant. In upholding the
validity of the entry, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals accepted the findings of the Nebraska
Supreme Court' that if the defendants left the
apartment separately and only one was arrested at
a time, the others would have been warned and
would have destroyed the evidence.90
The Thomas decision demonstrates the risks in-
herent in upholding the validity of warrantless
searches and seizures in this category. By the court's
own admission, the evidence was safe so long as the
operation was undetected.9 Clearly, a warrant
87 545 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.), afflden bane, 560 F.2d 1287
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977).
"8 524 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1975).
89 The Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Patterson,
192 Neb. 308, 220 N.W.2d 235 (1974), had affirmed the
defendants' convictions for possession of heroin with in-
tent to distribute. Having exhausted their state court
remedies, federal habeas corpus petitions were filed, chal-
lenging the validity of the warrantless search of the
apartment, and culminating in the Eighth Circuit deci-
sion in Thomas.
9° 524 F.2d at 782.
91 At the time of the raid, the officers did not know
that the defendants would be leaving in a few minutes,
could have been sought. If the defendants did
leave, they could have been arrested; if the defend-
ants did not leave at the same time, a warrantless
entry might then have been justified to preserve the
remaining evidence. As Judge Lay noted in dissent,
the officers could have prevented any removal by
guarding the door; r 2 if the occupants left, "there
were enough officers to detain them quietly and
far enough from the apartment so as not to alert
the remaining confederates."
9 3
Similarly, in United States v. Curran,94 government
agents had received information that marijuana
would be shipped out of the defendant's home in
small quantities. Agents subsequently stopped two
of three cars leaving the home and found mari-
juana in one. "[B]efore midnight, the surveillance
crew decided to raid the Cooley Road house."95
The government agent testified that when he ap-
proached the door to make inquiries, he smelled
marijuana and saw it in plain view. Fearing that
the defendants would dispose of the evidence while
a warrant was being obtained, the agents con-
ducted a warrantless search and confiscated the
drugs.
The Ninth Circuit court recognized that the
agents came "too close to creating their own emer-
gency."so However, the court reasoned that the
delay in getting a a warrant was justified since two
cars had already been stopped and "[b]y the time
a warrant could be obtained, much or all of the
marijuana could have been loaded into cars for
transportation." 97 According to the court, "many
more cars might arrive and depart"; 98 that "[a]n
arriving car might pass by the departing one
stopped by the agents"; s9 and the officers "might
have to release a driver who cooperated with the
house occupants but whose car had no evidence
inside. ,, '°°
but conducted the raid on "the assumption [that] there
would be insufficient time to obtain a warrant." Id. at
781. Although probable cause existed at the time the raid
was conducted and, additionally, it was known that the
defendants were themselves on the premises, the defend-
ants were not aware of any impending police intervention
so the evidence was not threatened with destruction or
removal as a consequence of any such knowledge.
9 Id. at 784 (Lay, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 786 (Lay, J., dissenting).




96Id. at 34.97 Id. at 35 (emphasis supplied).
98 Id (emphasis supplied).
9 Id. (emphasis supplied).
'0o Id. (emphasis supplied).
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Nevertheless, these speculative concerns did not
justify the emergency action taken by the officers.
Many more cars had not arrived and an arriving
car had not passed a departing car. Moreover,
there was no evidence that the surveillance had
been discovered. Thus, there was no immediate
need to proceed without the warrant. Unless and
until a more affirmative act occurred to justify
foregoing the warrant requirement, the agents
should not have taken the action which created the
emergency.
Other decisions have similarly tolerated war-
rantless searches in a broad range of circum-
stances.1 'O However, some courts have recognized
the potential for abuse and have invalidated the
warrantless entries and seizures of evidence. In
United States v. Rosselli,' °2 for example, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a warrantless
search for marijuana conducted on the belief that
the drug was about to be destroyed. There, police
had arrested the defendant but left his brother's
girlfriend and children behind while the defendant
led police to the apartment of a codefendant.
Shortly thereafter, without attempting to obtain a
1o See United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir.
1972), where a warrantless search was upheld on the
word of an informant that heroin was in the defendant's
apartment and would soon be moved, even though the
informant's information was not tested by the stringent
standard developed in Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964). In State v. Wiley, 522 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1975), a
tip from an anonymous informant, which was verified,
regarding drugs in a refrigerator in an apartment which
would be removed shortly was held to justify the war-
rantless entry into the apartment and search of the
refrigerator where the drugs were found, even though the
defendant was in the apartment under arrest. This deci-
sion was criticized in Note, Search and Seizure- The Destruc-
tion or Removal of Evidence Exception to the Warrant Requirement
Adopted in Missouri, State v. Wiley, 41 Mo. L. REv. 291
(1976). In United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d
4 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1974), a
reasonable belief that the defendant had discovered the
stake-out or might at any time learn of the officer's
presence, was held to justify the warrantless entry into
the defendant's garage to prevent the destruction of the
evidence. The court noted that the officers were not
creating exigent circumstances and that "[a] different
case would be presented if there were the possibility of
abuse." 488 F.2d at 8 n.4. In United States v. Doyle,
456 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1972), where a strong reason to
believe that the defendant realized "the heat was on"
was held to justify the warrantless entry and seizure of
the drugs. Additionally, the officers stated that it would
have taken about one hour and 20 minutes to obtain a
warrant, a delay which the court believed would have
very likely resulted in the destruction of the evidence and
the departure of the defendant.
'02 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1974).
warrant, police announced themselves to the
codefendant, heard running footsteps inside, and
proceeded to knock down the door. The govern-
ment claimed that exigent circumstances existed to
conduct a warrantless search because of the risk
that the girlfriend could have called ahead to warn
the codefz-idant and because of the codefendant's
reactions at the time of the knock.
However, the Seventh Circuit court found that
the agents easily could have prevented the risk of
a call by leaving an agent with the woman while
a warrant was being obtained1 °3 The Seventh
Circuit court focused on the fact that officers
knocked on the door instead of attempting to ob-
tain a warrant. While the court did not explicitly
suggest that the emergency was contrived, °4 the
court clearly was concerned that if permitted once,
this kind of situation might arise with more fre-
quency and could permit easy itvoidance of the
constitutional requirement that probable cause
generally be assessed by a neutral and detached
magistrate before a citizen's privacy is invaded.
The court further indicated that the emergency
could have been avoided in several ways:
In this case, the evidence does not adequately ex-
plain why no attempt to obtain a warrant was
made, or why no consideration was given to placing
the defendant's apartment under surveillance while
an attempt to secure a warrant was being made.
Had [the] defendant sought to leave during such a
period, he could have been arrested forthwith; and
prior to the knock at the door a conclusion that
marijuana was being destroyed could not have beenjustified. 105
Consequently, despite the findings that probable
cause existed and that individuals, were on the
premises and in possession of marijuana which
could be easily disposed of, the Seventh Circuit
court concluded that the officers had no justifica-
tion for foregoing the warrant requirement.1°6
io The court distinguished United States v. Rubin,
474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973), where upon being arrested
the defendant had yelled: "Call my brother." In Rubin,
the court found that there was no way for agents to
prevent such a call. See notes 72-77 and accompanying
text supra.
lo' "They had a right to pursue their investigation by
seeking voluntary cooperation from a suspect." But cer-
tainly the emergency which did ensue was forseeable. 506
F.2d at 630.
'o6 See also United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th
Cir. 1974), where the court rejected a government argu-
ment that sufficient exigent circumstances existed to
justify the entry into an apartment where drugs were
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In sum, courts have permitted warrantless entries
in a variety of situations in which evidence could
be destroyed by a suspect. When circumstances
beyond the officers' control necessitate immediate
action, the need to preserve evidence may well
justify the warrantless entry. However, such situa-
tions also present some potential for official abuse,
and if police were able to forego the warrant
requirement by creating an emergency, then the
fourth amendment would become a nullity.
III. THE EMERGING EXCEPTION AND THE NEED FOR
STRICT STANDARDS
Warrantless residential searches have sharply fo-
cused attention on the competing needs of privacy
in one's home and effective law enforcement.
Lower courts have approved warrantless entries
and searches in a broad range of cases and the
absence of clear and concrete Supreme Court guid-
ance seriously threatens to interfere with the guar-
antees of the fourth amendment. Thus, strict guide-
lines must be developed to govern the initiation
and scope of warrantless entries and searches.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR
wARRANTLESS ENTRIES
Most lower courts have applied either the
"threatened with destruction" language or the "im-
minent destruction" language in evaluating
whether police had reasonable grounds to believe
that immediate action was necessary to protect
evidence from destruction or removal.' 07 For in-
stance, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Rubin'1 8 stated that the Supreme Court has
only required a reasonable belief that evidence was
"threatened with destruction," and thus set forth
five factors to consider in determining the validity
of a warrantless entry:
(1) [T]he degree of urgency involved and the
amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant.
(2) [The] reasonable belief that the contraband is
about to be removed.
found. The officers knew, based on surveillance, that no
one was in the apartment to destroy the evidence and
thus the state had failed to prove that the evidence was
in any danger of destruction.
107 As stated above, it is possible that the two phrases
may overlap so that a warrantless search would be justi-
fied when evidence is threatened with imminent destruction.
See text accompanying note 45 supra.
'08 474 F.2d 262 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833
(1973). See also notes 72-77 and accompanying text supra.
(3) [TJhe possibility of danger to the police officers
guarding the site of the contraband while a
search warrant is sought.
(4) [The] information indicating the possessors of
contraband are aware that the police are on
their trail.
(5) [T]he ready destructibility of the contraband
and the knowledge "that efforts to dispose of
narcotics and to escape are characteristic behav-
ior of persons engaged in the narcotics
traffic."1l 9
These Rubin factors while applied specifically to
contraband in that case can be applied generally
and represent a useful starting point for determin-
ing the propriety of a warrantless entry and search.
However, it is further imperative to consider police
conduct and whether the ultimate emergency rea-
sonably could have been avoided.
The Project on Law Enforcement Policy and
Rulemakingl i° recognized the possibility of officers
creating the exigent circumstances to justify war-
rantless entries. "Failing to obtain a warrant when
time permits, then seeking consent to search, and
ultimately maintaining that an emergency arises
when consent is refused, has been referred to as a
'do-it-yourself' emergency and has been thor-
oughly criticized."' t The model rule formulated to
govern warrantless residential searches recognized
this concern. Project Rule 502 adopted the "im-
minent destruction" language and provided:
A. Residential Premises. When an officer has prob-
able cause to search for seizable items on resi-
dential premises and also has probable cause to
believe that such items are in imminent danger
of being destroyed or consumed, he may enter
such premises without a warrant, but may search
only to the extent necessary to recover the en-
dangered seizable items [and for no longer than
twenty minutes]."
2
The guidelines in Rubin and the Project Rule
should' be considered together in determining the
validity of warrantless residential searches. In this
process, courts must carefully consider whether
police action in any way prompted or accelerated
'09 Id at 268.
11 PROJECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND RULE-
MAKING, MODEL RULES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT-WARRANT-
LESS SEARCHES OF PERSONS AND PLACES (Approved Draft,
1974).
. Id. at 40.
112 Id. at 10.
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efforts to destroy the evidence. Such misconduct
may be least likely to create "exigent circum-
stances" where evidence is certain to be destroyed
by nature; it may be somewhat more likely where
police actually witness the efforts to destroy the
evidence or where police think the evidence might
be destroyed by the suspect or third parties.
Unless the Supreme Court adopts clear stan-
dards to guide law enforcement officials, probable
cause and the decision to enter a residence may be
determined in increasing numbers of cases by a
police officer and not by the detached magistrate
as mandated by the fourth amendment. The Court
could strike a reasonable balance between law
enforcement concerns and the fourth amendment
safeguards if it permitted warrantless entries and
searches of residences only where the evidence is
"threatened with imminent destruction," where the
guidelines set forth in Rubin are met, and where
police establish that their conduct did not create
or add to the emergency which resulted in the
entry. Further, the Supreme Court must emphasize
the importance of scrutinizing police conduct in
each warrantless entry. Absent strict and clear
guidelines, especially where police are not certain
that the evidence will be destroyed, the destruction
of evidence exception could swallow the fourth
amendment.
B. LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE AND DURATION OF
THE WARRANTLESS ENTRIES
Rule 502 of the Project on Law Enforcement
Policy and Rulemaking would limit the duration
and scope of warrantless searches by permitting a
search "only to the extent necessary to recover the
endangered seizable items [and for no longer than
twenty minutes]. ' )h 3 Decisions which have upheld
warrantless entries have similarly shown a clear
preference for limiting officer's freedom to search
until a warrant has been obtained. These decisions
permit a limited search to secure the premises and
to seize criminal evidence only if it is in plain
view."" Obviously, once the officers have made a
113 id.
1i4 See United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30 (9th Cir.
1974), where a motion to suppress was granted for mar-
ijuana found in a closed cupboard and a tire, but was
denied for marijuana found in plain view ory a table
during the time officers were securing the premises and
accounting for all the occupants. The marijuana in the
cupboard was not discovered until after all the occupants
had been arrested and the house had been secured.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the search
had not followed the limitations imposed by Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), when searches incident
warrantless entry and alerted the occupants, it may
not be feasible for all officers to leave to get a
warrant, and thereby give the occupants the op-
portunity to destroy the evidence. If all of the
occupants are arrested and officers have insured
that no one else is inside, then arguably Chimel v.
California,5 which permits a warrantless search
incident to a valid arrest in the area immediately
within the defendant's reach, would require that
officers obtain a warrant before conducting a full
search of the premises."1 6 If the defendants are
arrested and removed from the premises, then the
premises can be guarded to prevent confederates
or others from entering and destroying the evi-
dence.
A more difficult situation arises, however, when
police do not arrest any or all of the occupants but
nevertheless make a valid warrantless entry. If the
officers leave to obtain a warrant, it may be rea-
sonable to believe that the evidence will be de-
stroyed. If one officer leaves to obtain a warrant
and others remain to keep the premises secure and
to watch the occupants, then the occupants are
being detained without being subject to arrest.
Thus far, no decision has considered the scope of a
search when none or not all of the residents are
arrested following a warrantless entry. Possibly, the
unarrested individuals should be given the option
to leave the premises since the primary focus is on
preventing the destruction of evidence. However,
given the circumstances that prompted the war-
rantless entry, police should be able to maintain
control over the premises to ensure that the evi-
to arrest are involved. See also United States v. Delguyd,
542 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1976) and which justified entries
to arrest and secure the premises to the extent necessary
to prevent the destruction nor removal of evidence.
"5 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See also note 5 and accompa-
nying test supra.
"
6 See People v. Freeny, 37 Cal. App. 3d 20, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1974), where the defendant's wife was arrested
in their residence following a warrantless entry by police
to prevent the destruction of' narcotics contained
therein. There, the defendant's wife's arrest occurred at
5 p.m. and she remained detained for more than seven
hours before a search warrant was obtained. Although
officers had offered to take her to the station and book
her in the interim she chose to remain in the home until
the search warrant arrived. In commenting on the time
it took to obtain a search warrant, the court observed:
A fair reading of the majority opinion in Chime! is
that the search must be deferred until the warrant
is obtained, but that in the interim between arrest
and execution of the warrant the police may do
what is reasonable to prevent the destruction of
evidence of the crime.
Id., 112 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
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dence is not destroyed. Thus, police should be able
to secure the premises and seize evidence in plain
view. In addition, the Chimel doctrine should be
applied to limit the scope of the valid warrantless
search until a warrant is obtained, even though
that may take several hours.117 By limiting the
scope of the search until a warrant is obtained in
those situations where none or not all of the occu-
pants can be arrested, a balance is struck between
individual rights and the state's interest in preserv-
ing the evidence of a crime.
IV. CONCLUSION
Warrantless entries into residences to prevent the
destruction of criminal evidence are being permit-
ted in increasing numbers of cases under a newly
emerging exception to the warrant requirement of
the fourth amendment. Such entries should be
considered valid if officers actually witness evi-
dence being destroyed or if the evidence is
"threatened with imminent destruction" by na-
ture, the defendant, or third parties-but only
where the guidelines set forth in Rubin have been
met and where trial courts, after critical examina-
tion of police conduct, conclude that police did not
117 See note 59 and accompanying test supra.
create or add to the emergency which resulted in
the entry. Once a valid warrantless entry is effected,
equally careful consideration must be given to the
scope and duration of the warrantless search. Proj-
ect Rule 502 strikes a reasonable balance of con-
flicting interests by limiting the warrantless search
to the extent necessary to recover the evidence, and
for no longer than twenty minutes. Moreover, Chi-
mc v. California should be applied to limit the scope
of the search until a warrant is obtained.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet
established clear, workable guidelines to govern
residential searches which are conducted without
a warrant in order to prevent the destruction of
evidence. However, the Court's dicta has been used
by lower courts as the basis for approving these
searches in a broad range of cases. Thus, absent
strict guidelines, the propriety of entering a resi-
dence will increasingly be determined by a police
officer in the heat of an investigation, and not by
a neutral and detached magistrate. If that situation
results, the destruction of evidence exception could
swallow the general rule that searches and seizures
are "reasonable" under the fourth amendment
only if previously authorized by a neutral and
detached magistrate.
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